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I. INTRODUCTION 
“The courts finally realized that a child perpetrator—even of a 
horrible, insane, notorious crime—warrants a different kind of justice.”1  

* Vianca I. Picart is a third-year law student at Nova Southeastern University Shepard 
Broad College of Law.  This article was written to raise awareness to the juvenile sentencing issues that 
are currently taking place in the United States.  Other countries are analyzed for the purpose of finding a 
way to improve our system in the United States.  She would like to thank her parents for their love and 
support during every obstacle and milestone in her law school career. 
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The re-sentencing cases that are currently taking place throughout the 
United States stem from the decision in Miller v. Alabama.2  This case held 
that sentencing juveniles to life without the possibility of parole, even for 
major offenses, was considered cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment.3  This is one of many cases that address the re-
sentencing of juveniles.  Four years after the Miller decision, the Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of retroactivity in Montgomery v. Louisiana.4  
The Court held that their decision in Miller v. Alabama should be 
considered a new substantive constitutional rule, retroactive on state 
collateral review.5  As a result of this decision about 2000 juveniles now 
have a chance to be re-sentenced.6 
Prior to the Montgomery decision, the Florida Supreme Court, like 
other state courts throughout the United States, took steps to restructure its 
treatment of juveniles.7  For example, the Florida Supreme Court found that 
the Florida parole commission did not take into consideration how juveniles 
are different than adults.8  On Thursday, May 26, 2016, the Florida 
Supreme Court “dramatically expanded the number of juveniles—all of 
them convicted decades ago when the state still had a parole system—who 
can now ask a judge to set them free.”9  The Florida Supreme Court decided 
to give these juveniles a second chance by adopting the decision in Miller 
and applying it to its parole commission.10 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana has caused 
uproar throughout the states.  Inmates who were juveniles when sentenced 
now have the opportunity to have their case reviewed in light of these 

1.  Fred Grimm, The Madness Behind Middle-School Killer’s Case, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 
17, 2015, 4:54 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/fred-grimm/article 
39616800.html. 
2. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
3. Id. at 470, 489. 
4. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
5. Id. 
6. Saki Knafo, Here Are All the Countries Where Children Are Sentenced to Die in Prison, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 20, 2013, 3:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/20/juvenile-life-
without-parole_n_3962983.html. 
7. David Ovalle, Ruling Gives Hundreds of Juvenile Murderers Shot at New Sentences, 
MIAMI HERALD (May 26, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article 
8004 0602.html.  
8. Id.  
9. Id.  
10. Id.  
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decisions.11  This article will discuss the direct effect of recent juvenile re-
sentencing decisions as well as the indirect effect it has on the state and the 
families of the victims.  This article will further look towards other 
countries to find some resolution or means of improving the system the 
United States currently has in place. 
Section II of this analysis will discuss precedent and recent case law 
affecting the juvenile sentencing scheme in the United States, while 
focusing on the application in Florida as an example.  Section III will 
discuss the juvenile justice system reform and the consequences of these 
decisions.  Section IV will discuss the juvenile justice system in the United 
Kingdom and will compare it with the system in the United States.  Section 
V will discuss the juvenile justice system in Colombia and will compare it 
with the system in the United States.  Section VI will discuss the juvenile 
justice system in Australia and will compare it with the system in the 
United States.  Section VII will conclude by discussing how the system 
could be improved and whether juveniles who were sentenced to life 
without parole in the United States should be subject to re-sentencing.   
II. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES  
A. Precedent Case Law in the United States 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States has progressively 
worked towards providing troubled juveniles with a meaningful chance at 
rehabilitation and reintegration through the creation of juvenile courts and 
limited, special program-options as an alternative to incarceration.12  This 
section will discuss how the Supreme Court has steadily evolved its 
decisions to provide juveniles with fair and adequate sentencing.  This 
progression dates back to the 1960s where the Supreme Court ruled that an 
adolescent defendant was entitled to a hearing and a statement of reasons as 
to why a juvenile court made the decision to waive jurisdiction to the 

11.  Joshua Rovner, Juvenile Life without Parole:  An Overview, THE SENTENCING PROJECT 
1, 1 (May 5, 2017), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Juvenile-LifeWith 
out-Parole.pdf.  “Approximately 2,500 juveniles throughout the state now have a chance for release.”  
Id. 
12. The History of Juvenile Justice, A.B.A. 4, 5, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2017); see also 
Matthew Wallin, 13 Typical Punishments for Juvenile Offenders, WALLIN & KLARICH:  CAL. CRIM. 
DEF. BLOG, https://www.wklaw.com/juvenile-crime/13-punishments-for-juvenile-offenders#ref1. 
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criminal court.13  However, in the last decade, courts have re-framed their 
views on juvenile sentencing.14  This is a result of the increasing number of 
juveniles that are currently serving life sentences without parole.15  The 
Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, excessive fines, and bans the 
use of cruel and unusual punishment.16  Thus, the Supreme Court is steadily 
emphasizing a juvenile offender’s Eighth Amendment rights to correct the 
existing sentencing system.17 
In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court decided that all state 
courts, when sentencing a juvenile, must “consider all relevant mitigating 
evidence and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating 
circumstances.”18  This decision was a result of the trial judge determining 
that he did not want to, “as a matter of law, consider in mitigation the 
circumstances of petitioner’s unhappy upbringing and emotional 
disturbance.”19  The judge considered that the only mitigating circumstance 
was the petitioner’s youth, which in effect, is not sufficient to outweigh the 
aggravating circumstances of the case.20  The Supreme Court in this case 
held that the death sentence in question was to be vacated and the cause was 
remanded for further proceedings.21 
In 2005, the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons explained that the 
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” must be interpreted “by 
considering history, tradition, and precedent.”22  In doing so, the Court must 
refer to the “evolving standards of decency that marks the progress of a 
maturing society” to avoid punishments that are disproportionate to 
offenses.23  Roper provides three differences between adults and juveniles 
under the age of eighteen.24  First, juveniles tend to display “a lack of 

13. The History of Juvenile Justice, supra note 12, at 6. 
14. See generally Rovner, supra note 11, at 1. 
15. Id. 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
17. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010). 
18. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982). 
19. Id. at 104. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 105. 
22. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). 
23. Id. at 561.  
24. Id. at 569. 
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maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” more so than 
adults.25  Second, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative 
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”26  Third, the 
character of juveniles “is not as well formed as that of an adult.”27  Given 
that a juvenile’s personality is still developing, his or her personality is 
considered transitory.28  This case reassures that juveniles have more of a 
diminished culpability than adults do, thus deserving different treatment.29 
Five years later, the Supreme Court used this precedent in Graham v. 
Florida, which led to the beginning of a movement towards the re-
sentencing of juveniles.30  Graham involved a sixteen-year-old young man 
with a rough upbringing.31  In July of 2003, he and another three individuals 
around the same age “attempted to rob a barbeque restaurant in 
Jacksonville, Florida.”32  Florida law allows prosecutors to exercise 
discretion when charging sixteen and seventeen-year-olds as adults or 
juveniles for felony crimes.33  Graham was arrested for attempted robbery 
and the prosecutor on his case decided to charge him as an adult.34  Graham 
was charged with “armed burglary with assault or battery” and attempted 
armed robbery.35 
Under the offered plea agreement, Graham pleaded guilty to both 
charges.36  However, after a heart-felt letter, promising that it was his “first 
and last time getting in trouble” the trial court accepted the plea deal, 
withheld adjudication of guilt as to both charges and sentenced Graham to 




27. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 571.  
30. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010). 
31. Id. at 53.  Graham’s parents suffered from drug addiction and at an early age he was 
diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.  Id. 
32. Id. 
33. FLA. STAT. § 985.557(1)(b) (2016); Graham, 560 U.S. at 53. 
34. Graham, 560 U.S. at 53.  
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 54. 
37. Id. 
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was arrested six months later, once again, for a home invasion robbery.38  
Interestingly enough, Graham was only thirty-four days away from his 
eighteenth birthday on the night he committed the robbery.39 
The trial court found Graham guilty and “sentenced him to the 
maximum sentence authorized by law on each charge:  life imprisonment 
for the armed burglary and fifteen years for the attempted armed robbery.”40  
Before reaching the Supreme Court, the First District Court of Appeal of 
Florida took into consideration the seriousness of the offenses as well as 
their violent nature.41  It noted that Graham was not a pre-teen when he 
committed the offenses and pointed to the fact that he was sentenced at the 
age of nineteen.42  The Supreme Court then decided that a sentence of life 
without parole for juvenile offenders who have not committed a homicide 
offense is considered to be cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment.43  As determined in Roper, the Court must look towards the 
evolving standards of decency.44  The Court wants to enforce the Eighth 
Amendment by emphasizing that punishments should be proportional to the 
offenses.45  In Graham’s case, however, nothing prohibited Florida courts 
from “sentencing a juvenile nonhomicide offender to life without parole”; 
therefore, the sentencing judge sentenced Graham as he did because he 
found him incorrigible.46   
The Supreme Court determined that a state does not need to guarantee 
an offender eventual release.47  However, if it chooses to impose a sentence 
of life, it must provide a defendant with an opportunity to obtain release 
before the end of his or her prison term.48  Therefore, the Supreme Court of 
the United States reversed the judgement of the First District Court of 
Appeal of Florida and determined that the Constitution prohibits a life 

38. Id. 
39. Graham, 560 U.S. at 55. 
40. Id. at 57. 
41. Id. at 58. 
42. Id.  
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Graham, 560 U.S. at 74. 
44. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (citing to Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–
01 (1958)). 
45. Graham, 560 U.S. at 59. 
46. Id. at 76. 
47. Id. at 82. 
48. Id. 
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without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit a 
homicide.49 
Two years later, the Supreme Court made another decision that would 
once again reform juvenile sentencing.  The case of Miller v. Alabama 
determined that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a juvenile 
under the age of eighteen was considered cruel and unusual punishment, 
thereby violating the Eighth Amendment, even in a homicide offense.50  
The Court reviewed the cases of two juveniles:  Kuntrell Jackson and Evan 
Miller.51  The first case the Court reviewed under Miller was the case of 
Kuntrell Jackson, a fourteen-year-old who participated in a plot to rob a 
video game store.52  Before approaching the store Jackson found out that 
one of his friends was carrying a sawed-off shotgun in his coat sleeve.53  
Initially, Jackson stayed outside while his friends were inside the store, but 
moments later he entered and witnessed his friend shoot the store clerk after 
threatening to call the police.54  Jackson’s case was transferred to adult 
court where he was charged with capital felony murder and aggravated 
robbery.55 
The second case the Court reviewed was the case of fourteen-year-old 
Evan Miller who, after an evening of drinking and using drugs, beat his 
neighbor with the help of a friend, and set the man’s trailer on fire which 
led to his death.56  At one point, Miller placed a sheet over the neighbor’s 
head and told him, “I am God, I’ve come to take your life.”57  Miller’s case 
was transferred to adult court where he was charged with murder in the 
course of arson.58  Miller was eventually found guilty and the trial court 
sentenced him to the statutorily mandated punishment of life without 
parole.59  The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals later affirmed this 

49. Id.  
50. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 460, 479 (2012). 
51. Id. at 465, 467. 
52. Id. at 465. 
53. Id.  
54. Id.  
55. Miller, 132 U.S. at 466. 
56. Id. at 461. 
57. Id. at 468. 
58. Id. at 469. 
59. Id.  
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decision.60  Miller appealed, and the Supreme Court of the United States 
granted certiorari.61 
The Court in Miller relied on the decisions from Roper and Graham.62  
The Court concluded that the mandatory schemes in place did not allow a 
sentencing judge to consider the youth of a juvenile defendant; it did not 
allow for a judge to assess whether the law’s harshest term of imprisonment 
proportionately punished a juvenile.63  Roper and Graham, as emphasized 
by this Court, highlighted how the distinctive attributes that are unique to 
juveniles “diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest 
sentences on juvenile offenders.”64  This is because sentencing them to life 
without parole is essentially determining that the juvenile should be 
incapacitated because he is incorrigible; this is a trait that is not consistent 
with a child that is still capable of change.65 
The focus of the Court in Miller was the mandatory penalty that was in 
place for sentences.66  Under this sentencing scheme, juveniles were 
sentenced under the same guidelines as adults.67  This is a problem because 
as explained in Graham, Roper, and Eddings, juveniles are vastly different 
than adults, thus different factors should be considered when sentencing 
them to this kind of punishment.68  The Court noted that a life-without-
parole sentence shared characteristics with death sentences, which as stated 
in Roper, is considered cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment.69  The Court further cited to Solem v. Helm to point out that 
this is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile because he or she will 
spend a greater percentage of his or her life in jail than an adult who 
receives the same sentence.70  Thus, the Supreme Court found that a 
mandatory life-without-parole sentence violated the Eighth Amendment 

60. Miller, 132 U.S. at 461. 
61. Id. at 469. 
62. Id. at 471.  
63. Id. at 461.  
64. Id.  
65. Miller, 132 U.S. at 472–73. 
66. Id. at 474. 
67. Id.  
68. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 598–99 
(2005); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982). 
69. Miller, 132 U.S. at 474. 
70. Miller, 132 U.S. at 475; cf. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01 (1983). 
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and required a sentencing judge to take into account the difference between 
juveniles and adults.71  This decision does not, however, bar a sentencing 
judge from imposing a life sentence on a juvenile.72 
B. Lack of Guidance:  The Effects of Graham & Miller 
With approximately 2500 inmates in prison who were sentenced as 
juveniles prior to the Miller decision, State prosecutors are being 
bombarded with a new caseload.73  Inmates who were once sentenced to 
life-without-parole are now taking advantage of this opportunity by filing 
post-conviction motions for courts to review their case in light of these 
decisions.74  The problem stems from the Supreme Court not explicitly 
stating in its Miller decision whether this new law would only be applied 
prospectively or also be applied retroactively.75  Subsection one will discuss 
how courts addressed retroactivity in Florida leading up to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana.  Subsection two will discuss 
how courts throughout the states addressed retroactivity leading up to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana. 
1. Retroactive Application Throughout Florida 
Less than a year before the Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery 
v. Louisiana, the Florida Supreme Court came to its own decision on 
whether Miller would be applied retroactively.76  The Court in Falcon v. 
State held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller should be applied 
retroactively to a juvenile whose conviction was final at the time Miller was 
decided.77  This Court primarily relied on two Florida decisions to 
determine retroactive application.78  In Witt v. State, the Court established 
three guidelines that determine when a new law is applied retroactively in 

71. Miller, 132 U.S. at 479. 
72. Id. at 483. 
73. Rovner, supra note 11, at 1. 
74. See id. at 4. 
75. Brianna H. Boone, Note, Treating Adults Like Children:  Re-Sentencing Adult Juvenile 
Lifers After Miller v. Alabama, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1159, 1168–69 (2015). 
76. Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 956 (Fla. 2015). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 960–62. 
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Florida.79  A change in law is applied retroactively in Florida when:  “1. it 
emanates from this Court or the United States Supreme Court;” 2. “is 
constitutional in nature;” and 3. “constitutes a development of fundamental 
significance.”80  In this case, the first two prongs can be indisputably 
established; the Court in Falcon was only concerned with determining 
whether the Miller decision constituted a development of fundamental 
significance.81 
Using Witt as its foundation, the Court then cited to Toye v. State in 
which the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida determined that the 
Miller decision was retroactive.82  Prior to the Miller decision, Florida 
courts were required under the statutory sentencing guidelines to sentence a 
juvenile offender convicted of capital homicide to a life sentence without 
the possibility of parole.83  The opinion in Toye reasoned that the Miller 
decision “effectively invalidated Florida Statute § 775.082 (1)84, essentially 
invalidating the only statutory means of imposing a life sentence without 
the possibility for parole for juveniles”; thus, satisfying the third prong 
under the Witt analysis.85 
The rationale behind its decision emphasized that the State has an 
interest in the finality of convictions.86  It further argued that litigation must 
stop at some point; thus, the “absence of finality casts a cloud of 
tentativeness over the criminal justice system.”87  Despite this reasoning, 

79. Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 931 (Fla. 1980). 
80. Id. 
81. Falcon, 162 So. 2d at 960–61. 
82. Toye v. State, 133 So. 3d 540, 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
83. Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 961–62. 
84. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)(b)(1) (2016): 
A person who actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim and 
who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a capital felony, or an offense that was 
reclassified as a capital felony, which was committed before the person attained 
eighteen years of age shall be punished by a term of imprisonment for life if, after 
a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s. 921.1401, the 
court finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence.  If the court finds 
that life imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence, such person shall be 
punished by a term of imprisonment of at least forty years. 
85. Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 961; Toye, 133 So. 3d at 543. 
86. Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 960.  
87. Id. 
2018] Picart 487 
the Court believes that if Miller is not applied retroactively throughout the 
courts, there is a “patent unfairness” of having inmates who were sentenced 
prior to Miller to continue to serve life sentences, while others get the 
opportunity to serve lesser sentences because their convictions were not 
final when the Miller decision was issued.88  In continuing with the idea of 
fairness, the Court determined that given this decision, the appropriate 
remedy would be for inmates to present a timely Rule 3.850(b)(2)89 motion 
for postconviction relief.90  Once an inmate applies for this motion, courts 
should hold an individualized hearing pursuant to section two of chapter 
2014-220, where the court will “consider the enumerated and any other 
pertinent factors relevant to the defendant’s youth and attendant 
circumstances.”91 
Section one of chapter 2014-220 requires a factfinder to determine 
whether the defendant “actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill 
the victim.”92  If the courts find that this is the case, the defendant must 
receive at least forty years’ imprisonment with a subsequent review after 
twenty-five years.93  If the factfinder determines that the defendant did not 
“actually kill, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim,” the factfinder 
has more discretion in determining a sentence of any lesser term of years.94   
In the recent decision of Atwell v. State, the Florida Supreme Court 
addressed the current conflict between Florida’s parole system and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana.95  The opinion in 
this case addressed that an examination of Florida’s statutes and 
administrative rules governing the parole system demonstrated “that a 
juvenile who committed a capital offense could be subject to the same harsh 
penalties as an adult without considering any mitigating circumstances.”96  

88. Id. at 962. 
89. Rule 3.850(b)(2) Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence.  “[T]he fundamental 
constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for herein and has been held 
to apply retroactively, and the claim is made within two years of the date of the mandate of the decision 
announcing the retroactivity.”  Id. 
90. Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 964. 
91. Id.  
92. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)(b)(1) (2016); Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 963. 
93. Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 963. 
94. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)(b)(1) (2016); Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 963. 
95. Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040, 1048 (Fla. 2015).  
96. Id. at 1049.  
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Essentially, the decision to parole an inmate in Florida is considered “an act 
of grace of the state . . . ” and the objective parole criteria, by statute must 
“give primary weight to the seriousness of the offender’s present criminal 
offense and the offender’s past criminal record.”97 
The requirements set out by Florida’s parole system clearly did not 
afford special protections to juvenile offenders and do not take into 
consideration the diminished culpability of the juvenile at the time of the 
offense; essentially, the requirements established in Miller are not a part of 
Florida’s parole system guidelines.98  Subsequent to the Miller and Graham 
decision, Florida Legislatures enacted a new sentencing framework for 
juvenile offenders instead of offering parole as a means of complying with 
the Supreme Court’s decision.99  This new framework offers “term-of-years 
sentencing options for trial courts” and “subsequent judicial review of 
lengthy sentences.”100  Further, under this framework, the sentencing court 
can impose a forty years to life imprisonment sentence after it has taken 
into consideration the youth-related sentencing factors.101 
Under Atwell, a juvenile offender has the opportunity to have his case 
reviewed by a trial judge after twenty-five years, and that judge will then 
determine whether the offender’s sentence modification is warranted or 
not.102  A court will consider other factors, such as:  juvenile offender’s 
youth and other characteristics at the time he committed the offense; “the 
opinion of the victim or the victim’s next of kin concerning the release of 

97. FLA. STAT. § 947.002(2), (5) (2016); Atwell, 197 So. 3d at 1049. 
98. Atwell, 197 So. 3d at 1047–48. “Parole is the release of an inmate, prior to the expiration 
of the inmate’s court-imposed sentence,” followed by a period of supervision that is required to be 
successfully completed by compliance with the conditions and terms set out in the release agreement 
ordered by the Florida Commission on Offender Review.  Id.  The parole process begins with an initial 
interview with an eligible inmate and a hearing examiner.  Id.  At this meeting the examiner will use a 
salient factor score, “as well as the statutory severity of the inmate’s offense to determine a 
corresponding range of months on a matrix that will automatically provide a range of presumptive 
parole release dates.”  Id.  Under Florida statutory law, objective parole guidelines “must give primary 
weight to the seriousness” of the inmate’s past and present criminal offenses.  Id.  Once these factors are 
taken into consideration, the hearing examiner will provide the Commission with a written 
recommendation on the presumptive parole release dates, which are then reviewed by a panel of no 
more than two commissioners.  Id.  Once the presumptive parole release date arrives and the inmate’s 
institutional conduct and parole release plan is satisfactory, then the date will become effective and the 
Commission will then have a final review process to determine is the release date is still appropriate and 
will authorize or modify the date accordingly.  Id. 
99. Atwell, 197 So. 3d at 1042; see Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 407 (Fla. 2015). 
100. Atwell, 197 So. 3d at 1042.  
101. Id. at 1043.  
102. Id.  
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the offender from prison; and whether the juvenile offender remains at the 
same level of risk to society.”103  In light of these considerations, the 
Florida Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District’s decision upholding 
Atwell’s life sentence for first-degree murder and remanded the case for 
resentencing in order to conform to Florida Statute.104 
2. Retroactive Application Throughout the United States 
Prior to Montgomery, several courts addressed the issue of 
retroactivity in order to determine when it was appropriate to apply a new 
ruling retroactively.105  The Supreme Court turned away from its common 
law approach in 1965 and adopted a new decision in Linkletter v. Walker.106  
This case established that the Constitution does not require the courts to 
apply cases retroactively, nor does it prohibit a court from applying a 
decision retroactively.107  Therefore, the Court established a three-part test 
that would aid in determining whether a decision should be applied 
retroactively.108  This test first weighs the merits and demerits of the case 
by looking at the “history of the rule in question.”109  Second, the Court 
turns to the purpose and effect of the decision.110  Third, the Court 
determines whether the purpose of the decision “will further or retard its 
operation.”111 
 Throughout the years, this decision received a vast amount of criticism 
given that it provided inconsistent results, which gave the courts too much 
freedom in deciding which decisions would receive retroactive 
application.112  Justice Harlan, a critic to the Linkletter test, addressed the 
picking and choosing by the courts of those who do and do not receive the 
“benefit of a ‘new’ rule” and provided a distinction between direct review 
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103. Id. 
104. FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082, 921.1401–02 (2016); Atwell, 197 So. 3d at 1040. 
105.  See infra Part II, Section B. 
106. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); contra Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 
321–22 (1987). 
107. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629. 
108. Id.  
109. Id.  
110. Id.  
111. Id. 
112. Matthew R. Doherty, The Reluctance Towards Retroactivity:  The Retroactive Application 
of Laws in Death Penalty Collateral Review Cases, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 445, 453–54 (2004). 
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cases and collateral review cases in his dissent in Desist v. United States.113  
Justice Harlan argued that when a procedural due process rule is under 
collateral review, the rule should not be applied retroactively unless it 
provides “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the 
power of the criminal-law making authority to proscribe”; or if “it requires 
the observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.”114 
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane decided that all new 
rules, whether substantive or procedural, would be applied retroactively 
whenever they were under direct review.115  The plurality opinion further 
determined that a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure would not 
be applied retroactively to a case on collateral review.116  With this 
precedent in mind, it is understandable that courts throughout the states 
were somewhat uncertain on what to do after the Miller decision.  The 
Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect 
to a new substantive rule of constitutional law that controls the outcome of 
a case.117  This uncertainty resulted in states applying the Miller decision in 
different ways.118  Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania are 
just a few states that decided that the decision in Miller was procedural and 
not substantive, meaning that it is not a new rule.119  Similarly, there was no 
consensus among federal courts on the issue.120  Given the inconsistencies 
among state and federal courts regarding the application of Miller, the 
Supreme Court came to a decision that would create uniformity throughout 
the states.121 
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113. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 257–59 (1969); Doherty, supra note 112 at 454. 
114. Doherty, supra note 112, at 458; see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 290 (1989). 
115. Erin Dunn, Comment, Montgomery v. Louisiana:  An Attempt to Make Juvenile Life 
without Parole a Practical Impossibility, 32 TOURO L. REV. 679, 687 (2016). 
116. Teague, 489 U.S. at 290; Doherty, supra note 112, at 458; Dunn, supra note 115, at 688. 
117. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 723 (2016). 
118. Boone, supra note 75, at 1174. 
119. Id. at 1171. 
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121. See infra Part II, Section C. 
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C. Montgomery v. Louisiana:  Uniform Retroactivity 
As of last year, the Supreme Court held in Montgomery v. Louisiana 
that the “federal Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give 
retroactive effect to new substantive rules of federal constitutional law.”122  
Further, the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, prohibiting 
under Eighth Amendment mandatory life sentences without parole for 
juvenile offenders, “announced a new substantive constitutional rule that 
was retroactive on state collateral review.”123  The Supreme Court’s focus 
was determining whether Miller was substantive or procedural; the Court 
noted that Miller is “no less substantive than Roper and Graham” because it 
reserved life without parole sentences strictly for those juveniles “whose 
crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.”124  The decision in Miller does 
have a procedural component to it.125  The procedural component the Court 
refers to is the sentencing judge’s requirement to consider a juvenile 
offender’s “youth and attendant characteristics” when deciding whether a 
life without parole sentence is appropriate or not.126 
The State of Louisiana attempted to refute this contention; 
nonetheless, the Court fought back and justified its view by explaining that 
sometimes in order to implement substantive rules, a procedural 
requirement is necessary to only regulate “the manner of determining a 
defendant’s culpability.”127  This decision was received with hesitation and 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito, dissented due to 
their belief that the Court had no jurisdiction in deciding this case; they 
believed that the way in which the Court arrived at this decision was 
wrong.128 
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127. Montgomery, 136 U.S. at 734–35. 
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III. JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM & THE CONSEQUENCE OF THESE 
DECISIONS 
As previously noted, courts have emphasized re-sentencing juveniles 
who committed heinous crimes at a young age.  Their focus stems from the 
fact that juveniles, among other factors, are vastly different than adults 
because they are more susceptible to negative influences, have an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility, and their character is not as well 
formed.129  An important issue that is not addressed by the courts is that 
many of these defendants are no longer juveniles.130  Many of the inmates 
who are filing motions for post-conviction release are far beyond the age of 
seventeen.131  Essentially, these men are not vastly different from adults, 
because they are adults and no longer have the factors listed in Roper, 
which courts heavily rely on.132  In fact, many of them have developed their 
character and no longer carry the unique characteristics of youthfulness that 
are pertinent to children.133  However, the courts still feel that these men 
deserve a second chance at having their case heard because it is “patently 
unfair” to have inmates who were convicted prior to the Miller decision to 
not have a chance at re-sentencing.134 
Further, courts are not taking into consideration the ultimate effect that 
re-sentencing proceedings have on state prosecutors.135  Prosecutors are 
constantly assigned new cases, which in turn affects their performance and 
ultimately hurts the defendant and the victim’s families.136  One final issue 
that the courts do not discuss and for which there is little research on is the 
effect that re-sentencing has on the families of the victims who believed this 
horrific experience in their life was behind them.137  The following 
subsections will discuss the effect that retroactive application has on the 
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131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id.  
134. Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 962 (Fla. 2015). 
135. Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, Essay, The State (Never) Rests:  How 
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseload Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 262 (2011). 
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137. Christine Englebrecht et al., The Experiences of Homicide Victims’ Families with the 
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state prosecutors as well as the families of the homicide victims who are 
forced to relive the death of a loved one. 
A. Should “Juveniles” Sentenced to Life Without Parole Be Subject to 
Re-Sentencing? 
A juvenile’s experience in the prison environment can ultimately 
affect them for the rest of their lives; for example, depending on the facility 
they are sent to, juveniles sent to adult prisons are sometimes placed in 
isolation for up to twenty-three hours for their own protection.138  In 
addition to assessing mitigating factors when looking at the offender’s 
youth and attendant characteristics at the time he or she was sentenced, the 
court should also consider how the defendant has developed in the prison 
environment.139 
B. Overburdened State Prosecutors 
The U.S. Department of Justice conducted a National Census of State 
Prosecutors in 2007, where it found that the average caseload for a 
prosecuting attorney consisted of ninety-four felony cases for a full-time 
office.140  Further, it found that prosecutors’ offices, which serve more than 
a million residents, had, on average, 11,952 felony case convictions.141  A 
study conducted by the American Prosecutors Research Institute attempted 
to determine how many cases a prosecutor, on average, should be able to 
handle by using homicide cases as an example.142  They asked prosecutors 
to keep track of the total hours and number of dispositions for their 
homicide cases at three different disposition stages:  Pre-charge, Pre-trial, 
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and Trial.143  In total, the average time that should be allotted to bring a 
homicide case to a pre-charge disposition is 39 hours, 110 hours for a pre-
trial disposition, and a total of 246 hours for a trial disposition.144  Using 
this example, the study also took into account the amount of cases that can 
be handled along with the resources available and concluded that the 
average case weight was approximately ninety hours.145 
Using the average case processing time allowed this study to 
determine an estimate on the average amount of cases a prosecutor can 
properly handle.146  This was determined by calculating the actual time that 
is available to prosecutors per year and actual case processing time.147  This 
calculation was done by dividing the year value—time available in a year—
and the case weight—taking into account the type of case, and that results 
in the workload measure.148  Using the previous example and considering 
only homicide case weight, the average prosecutor can handle about twenty 
homicide cases per year, taking into consideration that this prosecutor only 
works on homicide cases.149  Further, this study notes that these are 
homicides at the pre-trial stage; if these were taken to trial, the case weight 
would be more.150 
Prosecutor Jessica Cooper from Oakland County reacted to the 
retroactive application of Miller:  “We have to find all the underlying facts 
of the case . . . review all of those.  It’s like we have 49 cold cases.”151  
Every re-sentencing case requires a prosecutor to dedicate a significant 
amount of time and effort which, based on the previously discussed study, 
is difficult to do considering their overwhelming caseload.152 
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C. The Effects of this Change on the Families and Friends of the Victims 
Another important aspect that courts have yet to address is the effect 
the re-sentencing process has on the families of the victims.  Research has 
shown that families of murder victims are “likely to experience 
psychological difficulties” after losing a loved one in a traumatizing way, 
such as depression and posttraumatic stress disorder.153  Families of 
homicide victims experience loss in a way that is unknown to most 
families.154  They have been subjected to an unexpected, tragic loss and 
simply seek justice for their loved ones.155  As Marilyn Peterson Armour 
found in her study on the subject, family members of homicide victims are 
neglected and they are not treated as the secondary victims that they are.156  
Further, these family members are indirectly forced to grieve their loss with 
the public because the murder of their loved one becomes a public event.157  
This results in prolonged bereavement that is controlled by the state and 
social milieu.158 
Essentially, whether these families want to or not, they are forced to be 
a part of the criminal justice system where they often feel their voice is not 
heard, resulting in feelings of anger and frustration.159  A study conducted 
in Bowling Green State University looked into the experience of thirteen 
families of homicide victims and discussed how the “death of their loved 
one affected their life . . . the needs that arose as a result of this 
victimization as well as any services they used” or found useful, and their 
overall experience with the criminal justice system.160  In “a system focused 
on processing offenders, with victim needs constituting a subsidiary 
interest,” the families felt an overall lack of compassion, struggle for 
control, conflicting goals, and a devaluation of life.161 
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Families reported that they did not “understand why a system which 
they believed should be protecting the interests of murder victims, was, in 
their view, so accommodating to defendants.”162  One mother from the 
study asked, “Why are their rights so guarded when they stole every right of 
our child?”163  Although this was a small interest group from Ohio, one 
could infer that many of the families that are being subjected to the re-
sentencing of a defendant, who stole the life of their loved ones, are feeling 
the same way.164  Another family member stated, “I thought that everybody 
would be looking out for our interests, and they’re not.  It’s completely 
opposite.  It’s all about them.”165 
The families in this study also found that one of the more difficult 
parts of their process in the system was accepting the sentences received by 
the offenders in their cases.166  They reported feeling that their loved one’s 
life was “devalued”; none of them felt that the defendant in their case 
received a sentence that was representative of the harm they caused.167  
Assuming arguendo, if this is the common sentiment of most homicide 
victim-families, re-sentencing juveniles will have most of these families 
feel as though the system does not care about serving justice for their loved 
ones because they are, once again, devaluing their life by allowing the 
defendant to possibly receive a shorter sentence. 
The criminal justice system, in many jurisdictions, does make an 
attempt to help and provide support to the families of homicide victims by 
giving them the option to consult a victim advocate.168  The study 
conducted by Bowling Green State University found that a few of the 
families mentioned having an advocate.169  When asked, those that did have 
an advocate had positive things to say about their experience with them.170  
Those who did not mention having an advocate were asked to shed light on 
why they did not have one, and one mother explained, “There was only one 
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victim’s advocate that I recall.171  That had to be an overwhelming job for 
one person because there was so much going on at the time.”172 
In 2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) reported an 
estimate of 14,249 murders in the United States.173  It is impossible to 
realistically provide each one of those murder-victim’s families with an 
advocate with the current system in place.174  The study conducted by 
Bowling Green State University further confirmed that current findings 
show that our criminal justice system may not be sufficiently equipped to 
meet the needs of these grieving families.175  Our system should place more 
of an emphasis on helping the families of these victims.  With re-sentencing 
hearings quickly rising throughout the country, our criminal justice system 
needs to promote and provide outreach groups for these families. 
The National Organization of Parents of Murdered Children, Inc. is a 
nationwide organization that seeks to help the survivors of homicide 
victims.176  This organization provides programs and services to grieving 
families by spreading awareness, training and informing society on the 
problems faced in the aftermath of murder, assisting in resolving unsolved 
cases, and helping keep murderers behind bars.177  If our criminal justice 
system were to have their victim advocates work alongside an organization 
such as this one, more families could possibly receive the help and support 
they need with the current re-sentencing changes. 
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IV. JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
A. The United Kingdom 
England and Wales has one of the highest rates of youth crime and 
violence in Europe.178  In fact, England has one of the largest youth 
custodial populations in Europe.179  Policymakers have worked towards 
reforming the juvenile justice system since the early 1900s by developing 
legislation that provides a reasonable means of prevention and early 
intervention.180  The process of creating this system for juvenile offenders 
has been a long process of trial and error.181  In 1982, policymakers passed 
the Criminal Justice Act of 1982, which represented “one of the first pieces 
of modern youth policy reform.”182  The Act set boundaries for judges when 
ordering a custodial sentence by requiring the judge to choose from three 
criteria before sentencing:  “the youth has been unresponsive to non-
custodial punishment; custody will ensure public safety; or the severity of 
the offense warrants custodial placement.”183  Prior to the establishment of 
this Act, there were approximately 7700 juveniles ages fourteen to sixteen 
in custody; that number decreased to 3200 after the Act was passed.184 
This progressive Act effectively decreased the number of juveniles in 
custody; legislators passed two separate acts given the lack of 
alternatives—The Children’s Act of 1989 and The Criminal Justice Act of 
1991—that separated juvenile offenders from juveniles in need of care.185  
The Acts further pushed the juvenile courts to order alternatives to custody 
such as informal warnings and police reprimands.186  The Acts were 
structured to help juvenile offenders committing minor crimes; this became 
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178. England and Wales, RESEARCH & EVALUATION CTR.: JOHN JAY C. OF CRIM. JUST. (Aug. 
29, 2012), https://jjcompare.org/category/england-and-wales/ [hereinafter England and Wales]. 
179. Id. 
180. Id.  
181. See infra Part IV, Section A. 
182. England and Wales, supra note 178.  
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. England and Wales, supra note 178; see also Dame Margaret Justice Booth, The Children 
Act 1989—The Proof of the Pudding, 16 STATUTE L. REV. 13, 14 (1995). 
186. England and Wales, supra note 178. 
2018] Picart 499 
an issue in 1993 when two ten-year-old boys abducted and killed a child.187  
The lack of attention placed on juvenile murderers brought about the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994.188  The public demanded 
stricter penalties for juvenile offenders, which extended custodial sentences 
to juveniles, ages ten to fourteen.189  With stricter sentences, the juvenile 
population housed in juvenile prisons increased.190 
In 1998, legislators, yet again, passed another act, which introduced an 
order for juvenile offenders and their parents.191  The Crime and Disorder 
Act of 1998 is considered to be one of the most “radical and challenging” 
legislations enacted to reduce crime.192  In addition to providing child safety 
orders and child curfew schemes, it established orders for anti-social 
behavior, sex offenders, and parenting, just to name a few.193  In regards to 
its focus on children, the Act sought to prevent juvenile crimes rather than 
focusing on rehabilitating juveniles and providing them with other options 
that did not involve incarceration.194  Despite the controversy surrounding 
the Act, it effectively reduced the custody of the juveniles by shortening 
their time in prison.195  Further, it made the parents more involved in the 
lives of their children by creating parenting orders where parents were 
required to “take control of their children and participate in parenting skills 
classes.”196  Should the parents decide not to participate or follow the order, 
parents would receive a fine and risk possible imprisonment if they neglect 
to pay the fine.197 
The United Kingdom’s goal was to shift its approach from custody-
based to divisionary juvenile justice.198  This has resulted in the 
establishment of two community-based options for offenders:  Suspended 
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Sentence Orders and Community Orders.199  These options provided 
offenders with an opportunity to remain in the community as opposed to 
receiving prison time.200  This program was established in 2005 as a result 
of the increasing juvenile population in prisons.201  The youth prisons in 
England remain flawed and costly.202  The Youth Justice Board continues to 
work on more effective means of punishment that allow for juveniles to 
remain in the community and to reduce incarceration rates.203 
B. Comparative Analysis:  United States and the United Kingdom 
Much like the United States, the United Kingdom has high juvenile 
incarceration rates.204  With an increase from 100 to 824 juveniles in prison, 
the United Kingdom noticed the problem and began reforming the juvenile 
justice system.205  Given that most of these juveniles were incarcerated for 
non-violent offenses, policymakers passed “one of the first pieces of 
modern youth policy reform.”206  The United States also realized, although 
in a different way, the harsh penalties juvenile offenders were receiving for 
non-violent offenses in Graham v. Florida.207  The Court in Graham 
determined that the penalty should be proportional to the offense, therefore, 
sentencing a juvenile to life-without-parole for a non-homicide offense was 
considered cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.208 
Although the United Kingdom has dealt with the issue in a different 
way, the ultimate purpose remains the same.209  Juveniles should receive 
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punishments that fit the crime they committed.210  The United Kingdom has 
worked towards fixing the issue by creating a variety of different acts aimed 
at providing juveniles with other options that do not involve 
incarceration.211  The different acts, however, have not remedied the 
problem.  The United Kingdom and the United States continue to have high 
juvenile incarceration rates, which seem to consistently fluctuate.212 
V. JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN COLOMBIA 
A. Colombia 
The Colombian juvenile justice system traditionally did not have a 
system tailored for juveniles.213  Instead, judges took on a parent-like 
discretionary role resulting in a tutelary-like system where juveniles were 
sometimes treated in the same way as adults.214  The juvenile justice system 
in Colombia was reformed in 1989 and again in 1990; thus, they now have 
the Code on Minors and the Code on Childhood and Adolescence.215  Prior 
to establishing the Code on Minors and the Code on Childhood and 
Adolescence, there were only three options for juveniles at the time of 
sentencing:  community service, probation, or imprisonment.216  This 
resulted in juveniles being sentenced with adults and having indeterminate 
sentences that allowed prison staff to extend a juvenile’s sentence for as 
long as he or she thought would be best.217  Now, the system allows for 
juveniles to be held criminally responsible for:  reprimand, community 
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Colombia pursued their mission to restore their juvenile justice system 
by enacting the standards of the United Nations.219  With this new reform, 
Colombia now requires that the minimum age of criminal responsibility be 
eighteen.220  Younger children who commit crimes are still held 
responsible, however, they are prosecuted under the juvenile justice system, 
as opposed to removing them to adult courts.221  The goal of their system is 
to rehabilitate and restore in juvenile punishment and promote the 
pedagogical approach much like the United States of America.222  This is a 
difficult goal to achieve given Colombia’s history of rebellion and 
insurgency as a result of using children as soldiers by guerilla forces.223  In 
the process of developing a fair juvenile justice system, Colombian 
legislatures have decided that minors are not to be held accountable for war 
crimes they were a part of.224 
In 2006, Law 1098 updated the Code on Adolescence and Childhood, 
which added references to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Children (UN CRC) and removed a clause that allowed for juveniles to be 
prosecuted under the Criminal Code, unless they were being charged with a 
serious crime.225  Law 1098 created the System for Youth Criminal 
Responsibility, which outlined twelve principles for the protection of 
juveniles and specialized a system seeking to rehabilitate juveniles as 
opposed to simply incarcerating them.226  The detention facilities are now 
strictly available for minors and are managed by the Colombian Institute for 
Family Welfare.227  Despite all the efforts placed into creating a fair system 
for juveniles, there has been an increase in juvenile detention.228  “In 2014, 
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8060 juveniles under the age of 18 were under the supervision of the 
System for Youth Criminal Responsibility, and 3145 were incarcerated.”229 
B. Comparative Analysis:  United States and Colombia 
Colombia relies on the Code on Minors and the Code on Childhood 
and Adolescence to regulate their juvenile justice system.230  The United 
States, on the other hand, relies primarily on case law and a juvenile’s 
Constitutional rights to regulate their juvenile justice system.231  Colombia 
has evolved, much like the United States, in developing appropriate 
sentences for juveniles.232  This is possible as a result of Colombian 
legislators re-shifting their approach through more regulation on the 
treatment of juveniles and the levels of punishment they can receive.233 
Given that Colombia has a problem with juveniles being recruited by 
guerilla forces, the government has modified its system to avoid criminally 
punishing juveniles who were forcibly recruited into these groups.234  
Although the United States does not have a problem with forced guerilla 
recruitment, it too has modified its laws in order to provide fair punishment 
for juveniles.235  Analogous to Colombia, the United States noted the unfair 
treatment that juvenile offenders were experiencing in receiving life 
sentences without parole for non-homicide offenses, and moved towards 
improving its system by holding in Graham that this punishment was 
unconstitutional.236  Juveniles are vastly different than adults, therefore their 
sentences should not be the same.237 
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VI. JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN AUSTRALIA 
A. Australia 
For years now, Australia has addressed the issues behind the juvenile 
justice system in many ways.238  For example, in 1895, the country 
established a court for youthful offenders.239  Further, the courts have 
allowed officers to have discretion when handling a juvenile who has 
violated the law.240  Officers have the option to issue a formal or informal 
citation, or to refer the juvenile to the Youth Justice Court.241  Officers opt 
to help juveniles and involve them in community-based supervision instead 
of sending them to jail.242  Community-based supervision consists of a 
variety of options for juveniles including:  probation, parole, youth 
supervision orders, and youth attendance orders.243  As a result, youth 
incarceration rates in Australia are significantly lower than in the United 
States.244  In 2006 and 2007, there were 10,675 juveniles under formal 
supervision in Australia—83% were under community-based supervision, 
46% were under detention supervision, and 29% were in both forms of 
supervision.245 
Juveniles that do not qualify for community-based supervision either 
plead guilty or are found guilty, and ninety-two percent of the adjudicated 
cases result in a non-custodial sentence.246  This is a result of policymakers 
in Australia striving to remove juveniles from the criminal justice system 
and reduce the time they spend incarcerated.247  Juvenile justice throughout 
Australia differs in each territory because each government has its own set 
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of laws and diversionary options.248  Each region has implemented its own 
method of addressing juvenile justice in order to provide juveniles with a 
fair chance at life.249 
For example, in Victoria the government has strived to reform their 
juvenile system since 2000.250  High-risk juveniles are separated from 
dangerous juveniles and are sent into rehabilitative programs and 
transitional support systems have been implemented to aid juveniles in 
transitioning out of custody.251  Western Australia bases their juvenile 
justice system off the Young Offenders Act of 1994.252  This Act seeks to 
keep juveniles out of the judicial system and instead rehabilitates them.253  
Implementing this kind of system has an annual cost of $190,000 per 
juvenile—a very expensive alternative with long-term benefits.254  Western 
Australia has also implemented an Intensive Supervision Program designed 
for juvenile offenders considered the state’s more serious repeat 
offenders.255  In establishing this program, Western Australia has reduced 
recidivism and lowered taxpayer costs for imprisonment.256  This program 
provides juveniles with opportunities to participate in therapeutic and 
mediation programs.257 
Given that each state has its own set of juvenile laws, the incarceration 
rates fluctuate throughout the country.258  The Northern Territory, for 
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likely a result of their intolerance for repeat offenders.260  Unlike other 
regions, Corrective Services prohibit these juveniles from diversions such 
as written or oral warnings and victim-offender conferences.261  One 
interesting factor is the weight the government places on a juvenile 
offender’s parent and their involvement in the juvenile’s life.262  For 
example, the Family Responsibility Order requires parents to become more 
involved in their child’s life by ensuring their child follows through with 
any conditions required of them, such as:  “ensuring their child attends 
school, ensuring their child is home by a certain time or that the child 
avoids contact with a particular person or place.”263  The parents are held 
accountable under this order and if they fail to fulfill their duties, the 
parents will be punished with fines and/or seizing of non-essential 
household items just to name a few.264 
B. Comparative Analysis:  United States and Australia 
Australia’s effective juvenile system has positively impacted its 
juvenile offenders.265  This effective system and generally low incarceration 
rates are a result of the country’s emphasis on minimizing the number of 
juveniles in prison.266  Much like the United States, Australia has 
specialized courts for juvenile offenders.267  However, Australia provides 
juveniles with more options than the United States.268  
In providing its juvenile offenders with community-based supervision, 
Australia reserves incarceration for its serious juvenile offenders.269  The 
United States has moved towards lowering the rate of incarcerated juvenile 
offenders for minor offenses through case law, thereby assuring harsh 
penalties be reserved for serious crimes.270  Jurisdictions in the United 
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States increasingly use similar methods to conserve financial resources and 
reduce youth incarceration.271  As previously mentioned, courts are also 
placing a greater amount of responsibilities on the juvenile offenders’ 
parents.272  Legislators in the United States have not established a Family 
Responsibility Order-like act that would require juvenile offenders’ parents 
to become more involved in their child’s life.273  Should this be 
implemented, young offenders may receive the structure they desperately 
need in the United States. 
VII. CONCLUSION:  HOW CAN THE SYSTEM BE IMPROVED?  SHOULD 
JUVENILES WHO WERE SENTENCED TO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE BE SUBJECT 
TO RE-SENTENCING? 
“Unlike other countries, we fail to acknowledge their youthfulness and 
often other factors that contribute to their crimes.”274  The United States has 
traditionally had a “tough on crime” view, which has been applied to 
juveniles throughout the years.275  The Supreme Court in Graham and 
Miller ultimately sought to re-structure the sentencing scheme for juveniles 
to give them a real chance at life.  The Court emphasized this issue because 
it effectively established that juveniles are vastly different than adults for 
several reasons.276  Given these differences, the Court found that sentencing 
juveniles to life without parole was considered cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.277  Imposing the harshest 
sentences on juveniles does not satisfy the penological justifications of 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 
Although the Court makes a great argument for re-structuring the 
juvenile sentencing schemes, their decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana 
tackles a different issue while still applying the decisions of Graham and 
Miller.  By applying these decisions retroactively, the Court is allowing 
inmates who were sentenced prior to 2012 to have their case reviewed by a 
judge who will look at the inmates’ youth and attendant circumstances at 
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the time of the offense.  However, the Court has not addressed the fact that 
some of inmates are no longer juveniles.  Most of the inmates, whom this 
law affects, have spent their young adult lives in prison, are no longer 
juveniles, and have learned to adapt to prison life.  These inmates are being 
re-sentenced as juveniles, yet most of them are no longer juveniles.  
Granted, some of these juveniles committed non-homicide offenses; thus, 
those who committed homicide offenses should not be afforded the same 
benefit as seen in the Montgomery decision. 
In issuing this landmark decision, the Supreme Court should have first 
taken into consideration whether the inmates that would be applying for a 
resentencing hearing were fit to be released back into society.  Making 
Miller a retroactive decision not only impacts a significant number of 
prisoners, but it also places an additional burden on an already 
overburdened state.  Further, re-sentencing cases greatly affect the families 
of homicide victims whom are forced to relive a horrific moment in their 
lives.  The families of these victims are considered secondary victims 
whom are thrown into the criminal justice system unexpectedly while 
simultaneously grieving the loss of a loved one.  Having them relive this 
experience re-exposes them to the trauma, which could lead to permanent 
long-term effects. 
The juvenile justice system in the United States is by no means a 
perfect system.  In comparing the United States to other countries, it is clear 
that each country has undergone a process of trial and error to find a fair 
and impartial juvenile justice system.278  Offering juveniles a second chance 
at life is an important issue that the Supreme Court continuously works to 
achieve.279  Ultimately, plenty of studies and case law demonstrate that 
juveniles are vastly different than adults.280  Therefore, they should not be 
treated and sentenced in the same way.  However, while courts are shedding 
light on this issue, they are ignoring other important factors that also require 
their attention.  Unlike the United Kingdom, Colombia, and Australia, laws 
in the United States do not provide many options for juvenile offenders.281  
Legislators should consider incorporating more community-based 
programs, which allow courts more leeway when determining an 
appropriate sentence for a juvenile offender.  Further, legislators should 
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incorporate, much like in Australia, the families of juveniles and hold them 
accountable for aiding in the rehabilitative process. 
Given the recent decisions discussed in this article, courts throughout 
the states are constantly adapting and re-organizing themselves while 
attempting to properly handle these cases.  Each area still requires a 
significant amount of research, which will only come with time.  With big 
decisions come big consequences.  The Supreme Court’s new 
implementations should be fair for all, not just the defendants.  Juveniles 
know how to distinguish right from wrong.  They know they can be 
punished if they steal.  They know that killing someone can send them to 
prison.  Our focus should be on helping these juveniles by finding 
appropriate sentences that fit the crime they committed.  However, it is 
crucial not to lose sight of the fact that these juvenile-based laws are being 
applied to those who committed heinous crimes.  

